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This book is on the Cold War and the politics of history. It is a 
multidimensional subject. On one hand, it concerns the different roles 
of history in the confrontations called the Cold War. The topic includes, 
on the other hand, the many-faceted presence of Cold War experiences, 
interpretations and conclusions in post-Cold-War politics. 
The very concept of the Cold War should be seen as a historical 
interpretation that has varied and changed over time. The way in which 
it has been periodized in post-1990 historical research obviously differs 
from the ways people between the late 1940s and the late 1980s conceived 
of their experiences and expectations. 
For many of them, ‘the Cold War’ was a concept referring to certain 
phases of the East-West confrontation rather than to this confrontation 
itself. The Cold War proper had started with the breakdown of the 
wartime Grand Alliance in the mid-1940s, reached its high point during 
the Korean War 1950–53, and ended in the so-called fi rst détente in the 
mid-1950s. As people saw it, the crises of 1958–62 from Berlin to Cuba 
had brought the world on the brink of an actual war. Then there were 
phases in which one spoke about a return to the Cold War, or ‘the Second 
Cold War’, as  Fred Halliday provocatively entitled his book in 1982 on 
the increased tensions in the late 1970s and early 1980s between the 
United States and the Soviet Union.1 
1 F. Halliday, The Making of the Second Cold War. London: Verso 1983.
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For many contemporaries, the East-West confrontation, as such, 
gradually came to represent a mode of existence of the present and future 
world that was, more or less, taken for granted. The term ‘war’ in ‘the 
Cold War’, with its inherent notion of temporal emergency condition, 
does not meet such an experience of normalcy in the bipolar world. On 
the other hand, the metaphorical ‘war’ in the current usage of the concept 
of ‘the Cold War’ may ignore the unique fatality that was associated with 
the next world war, nuclear war, in people’s minds and fears during the 
so-called ‘balance of terror’ and ‘mutually assured destruction’.
Further, there have appeared historical interpretations about the 
epochal change around 1990 for which the ‘the end of the Cold War’ 
is far too limited an expression. In the aftermath of the revolutionary 
upheaval in East and Central Europe in 1989 the historian  Tony Judt, 
highlighting the resurgence of populism, nationalism, anti-Semitism 
and other counter-Enlightenment movements in the post-communist 
societies, declared 1989 not only the end of the Cold War, but also as the 
end of the Enlightenment era.2
In a similar vein, the theses on ‘the end of history’ have suggested that 
the epoch then reaching its end was much longer than just the one of the 
post-Second World War international confrontation. Two main variants 
of the end of history -interpretation exist. The most famous one is the 
Hegelian thesis that  Francis Fukuyama developed with support from 
 Alexandre Kojève, claiming that through the victory of liberal capitalism 
and political democracy in the Cold War, history had reached its goal.3 
Another variant, drawing from the anti-Hegelian critique of ‘historicism’ 
by  Karl Popper, argues that as the outcome of Cold War, the ideologies 
based on the view on History with capital H, i.e. history as a supra-
personal power oriented to certain direction, suffered a decisive defeat. 
Thus, no one could any longer claim to be the true agent of a law-like 
historical process.4 In different ways, these both variants of the end of 
2 T. Judt, ’Nineteen Eighty-Nine. The End of  Which European Era?’, in V. 
Tismaneanu (ed.), The Revolutions of 1989. Rewriting Histories. London and 
New York: Routledge 1999, 165–180.
3 F. Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man. New York: Free Press 
1992. 
4 A. Touraine, Critique of Modernity. Oxford UK & Cambridge USA: Blackwell 
1995, 61–87. 
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history -thesis have linkages with post-modernist theses on the end of 
‘grand narratives’.
One does not need to delve very deeply into these discussions to fi nd 
that while all these different notions of ‘end’ are dubious, they, at the 
same time, imply the signifi cance of history as a dimension of Cold War 
confrontations. We may distinguish between three levels of confl ict. At 
each level, history played crucial although divergent roles as an aspect 
of the confl ict. 
At the fi rst level, the period defi ned from the post-1990 perspective 
as the Cold War was characterised by the political-military confrontation 
between the East and West blocs, dominated by the Soviet Union and 
the United States, respectively. At this level, some space also existed 
for neutrality recognised by both parties. One might say that, at this 
level, history as an aspect of the confl ict was actualised, in the fi rst 
place, from a realist perspective of international politics. For the actors 
of international power politics, e.g.  Henry Kissinger who is examined 
by  Jussi Hanhimäki in this book, history appeared as magistra vitae, i.e. 
as a store of lessons and the knowledge on previous similar cases to be 
utilised in decision-making. The tendency to view history, for example 
the case of democratization of West Germany, as a guide for current 
policy-making, has not disappeared, as is shown by  Heinrich August 
Winkler in the book’s fi nale. 
Other Cold War era statesmen, such as Finnish presidents  J. K. 
Paasikivi and  Urho Kekkonen, rooted their statecraft too on long historical 
continuities, external necessities and immutable geopolitical realities – 
as they perceived them – and as are analysed by  Dörte Putensen,  Raimo 
Väyrynen,  Timo Soikkanen and  Kimmo Rentola in the last section of the 
book. 
According to the school of thought represented by Kissinger and other 
realists, the Cold War was not a unique phenomenon in itself, but only 
another phase in the longue durée in the history of international politics 
and great power confl icts. If this was the case, then ancient principles in 
the uses and usefulness of diplomacy, deterrence and military force, were 
still relevant, irrespective what the geopolitical particularities of the Cold 
War international system were. For others, however, the Cold War, with 
the dual appearance of previously unseen weapons of mass destruction 
and ideologies as driving forces of foreign policy, meant that the confl ict 
was not just another cold war, but a Cold War with capital letters.
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This leads us to the second level of the Cold War, which included 
the confl ict between rivalling socio-economic systems, socialism and 
capitalism. Of course, the notion of inter-systemic confl ict, namely the 
confl ict between capitalism and socialism, was a political reality long 
before the Cold War. Moreover, it is reasonable to question whether 
the East-West confl ict ever managed to encapsulate the rivalry between 
socialism and capitalism. Nevertheless, such an effort, based on the 
authority of history, was a crucial part of the Cold War as this inter-systemic 
confl ict was in the core of the legitimation of Soviet communism. 
It may be useful to recall that in his book Capitalism, Socialism and 
Democracy from 1942,  Joseph A. Schumpeter asked whether capitalism 
can survive and answered: ‘No, I don’t think it can’. On the subsequent 
question, ‘Can socialism work?’, his answer was unambiguous: ‘Of course 
it can.’ Far from being any advocate of socialism, Schumpeter found in 
the dynamics and achievements of Western capitalism an inherent ten-
dency towards socialism that had been accelerated by the First World 
War, the Great Depression and the Second World War. According to his 
prefaces to the second edition in 1946 and the third edition in 1949, post-
war developments, notably in Britain and the United States, had provided 
further support for his argument.5
While highly original in his analysis, Schumpeter was but one of the 
intellectuals that during the wartime and the immediate post-war years 
constructed images of a future society within a framework dominated by 
the confrontation between capitalism and socialism. Most notably, his 
analysis is an example of the fact that in 1946 or even in 1949, it was far 
from self-evident to identify this confrontation with the confl ict between 
the West and the East. The socialism Schumpeter foresaw winning in 
Britain and the United States did not result from an expansion of the 
Soviet power sphere and a subsequent implementation of the Soviet 
model. Actually, the Soviet Union and communism represented for 
Schumpeter a ‘non-orthodox’ form of socialism which, though, might 
later evolve towards Western socialism, including the Western ways in 
which socialism and democracy would be combined together.     
Two infl uential interpretations of the Cold War confl ict have made 
it easy to reduce the confl ict between socialism and capitalism to the 
5 J. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy. Introduction by R. 
Swedberg. London and New York: Routledge 1995 [orig. New York: Harper and 
Brothers 1942].
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East-West confl ict. First, an integral ideological ingredient of the East-
West confrontation was the Marxist-Leninist theory on two confronting 
camps that represented two historically successive social formations, 
capitalism being the lower and socialism the higher stage of world 
history. This theoretical view also preconditioned the role and orientation 
of historical research, as appears from  Manfred Menger’s account of 
the institutionalisation of academic history in the German Democratic 
Republic in this book, as well as from  Seppo Hentilä’s numerous works 
on historical research in the divided Germany.6
Second, also the neo-liberalist view on historical progress that 
became highly infl uential after the collapse of the Soviet Union tended to 
identify the confl ict between socialism and capitalism with the Cold War 
confl ict. According to the latter interpretation, the solution of the Cold 
War had universally liberated the natural and, consequently, right mode 
of economic and social dynamics and wealth creation. Reverberations of 
this vision of capitalism having passed the test of ‘war’ against its binary 
opponent have not only been felt in the United States and the Western 
democracies7, but also in the ex-socialist countries of Central and East 
Central Europe. As  Katalin Miklóssy shows in her study of the identity 
reformation of the Hungarian left after 1989, the successor party of the 
old regime had to adapt to neo-liberal ideals and individualism, and also 
6 S. Hentilä, Jaettu Saksa, jaettu historia. Kylmä historiasota 1945–1990 – Zu-
sammenfassung: Geteiltes Deutschland, geteilte Geschichte. Etappen eines kalten 
Geschichtskrieges 1945–1990. Helsinki: Suomen Historiallinen Seura 1994;
S. Hentilä, ’Der Kampf um die deutsche Geschichte: vergleichende Überle-
gungen zur Geschichtsschreibung im geteilten Deutschland’, in Vom öffent-
lichen Umgang mit Geschichte. Tampere: Tampereen yliopisto 1995, 63–85;
S. Hentilä, ’Saksan historiantutkimus yhdistymiskriisin kourissa’, Historialli-
nen Aikakauskirja 93 (1995:2), 138–144; S. Hentilä, ’Über den öffentlichen 
Ge brauch der Geschichte’, Nordeuropa forum (1998: 2), 83–90; S. Hentilä, 
’His torieforskningen i DDR kontrollerades av “Sanningens ministerium”’, 
Historisk tidskrift för Finland (2005:1), 108–122; S. Hentilä, ’Löytyykö totuus 
komissioista. Historiantutkimus ja totuuskomissiot’, Tieteessä tapahtuu 8 (2005), 
5–12, also published in Suomalainen tiedeakatemia. Vuosikirja 2005, Helsinki: 
Suomalainen tiedeakatemia 2006, 87–96.
7 See for example the contributions in E. Schrecker (ed.), Cold War Triumphalism. 
The Misuse of History After the Fall of Communism. New York and London: The 
New Press 2004.
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to face the diffi culties involved in making a distinction between pre-1989 
reformist socialism and post-1989 social democracy.
On the third level, the Cold War was a confl ict of political regimes, 
including the dimensions of democracy, citizenship and human rights. 
Here, the role of history was associated with the rivalry between 
confl icting visions on human agency and the relationships between the 
individual, society and the state. 
After the end of Cold War, the so-called history-political debates 
concerning the period have very much focused on this particular level of 
the confl ict, and the other levels of confrontation – those of the political-
military confl ict and the confl ict of socio-economic systems – are 
discussed from the point of view of the third level. Thus, the history-
political controversies analysed in many chapters of this book include 
not only accounts of the repression people faced in the countries of 
communist rule, but also debates in which politics and politicians of the 
Cold War era in non-communist countries like Denmark or Finland are 
criticised for having ignored the evilness of the communist system, as 
shown by  Poul Villaume in his article on the Danish case.
This means, that the frame in which individuals and individual acts 
and decisions are often seen in the post-Cold War world, is through the 
prism of this ‘master confl ict’ between two different political regimes. 
The pertinent question of the 1940s, in time of alliance and bloc building 
about ‘whose side were you on’, became again increasingly relevant 
after 1990. Irrespective of what the individuals’ views and positions on 
the fi rst and second dimensions of the confl ict had been, their actions in 
subsequent analysis could judged using the yardstick of the fi nal outcome 
of the confl ict between the two political regimes. 
 Henry Kissinger and other realists could be criticised for having 
engaged in negotiations with a lethal enemy and President Urho Kekkonen 
– at least momentarily – for assessing socialism’ inner strengths too high 
over US-style capitalism, or promoting a positive image of  Lenin as a 
guarantee of Finland’s independence, the phenomenon investigated by 
 Joni Krekola in this book. Lesser politicians and individuals could be 
accused for having become fellow travellers, fi nlandized, soft on issues 
such as German reunifi cation and NATO-policies, or guilty of undue 
impartiality in the general portrayal of the two competing systems in 
popular histories, television programs, newspaper articles and school 
books, the latter of which are scrutinized here by  Sirkka Ahonen. As the 
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defeated side appeared as an oppressive regime, it became easy to take 
for granted that the victorious side must stand for liberty. The call from 
the US in the 1940s for Europeans ‘to stand up and be counted’ in the 
struggle against communism, echoed in the 1990s as a call for Cold War 
contemporaries to exclaim where they had exactly stood at the time. This 
call has applied as much for historians as for anyone else in a public 
position during the ‘war’, whether they at the time realised that they were 
players in it or not.
In this history political reassessment of Cold War experiences 
historians have been involved in several different ways. The currents 
of the Cold War itself infl uenced general historical interpretations of it, 
and most famously on its origins. Traditionalist, revisionist and post-
revisionist interpretations emerged as the confl ict matured.8 As Western 
authors were preoccupied in fi guring out the sequence of events that had 
dissolved the wartime alliance, in the Soviet Union and in the other socialist 
countries, correct views of history played an even more important role, as 
 Aappo Kähönen shows in his article on the linkages between legitimacy, 
reforms and Soviet history politics. In post-war Germanies, discussed by 
 Wilfried Loth and  Hannes Saarinen, history perhaps more than anywhere 
in the Cold War world concerned the future and the present, and maybe 
not so much the past at all. In countries such as Finland not only Cold 
War history, but any type of national or international history could be 
viewed through the prism of Cold War ideological rivalry, as seen in 
controversies on national history and commemoration, analysed by 
 Tauno Saarela and  Heino Nyyssönen in this book.
After the Cold War a twofold task and challenge for historians 
emerged. As the main intellectual currents among the profession led 
away from the aim of establishing fi nal truths about the past, especially 
on issues of the magnitude and complexity as the Cold War was, a public 
call was made for historians – and by some historians – now to tell what 
the Cold War really had been about. Some heeded the call, starting from 
the premise that only after events had taken their full course from 1941 
(or 1917) to 1991, could a fi nal judgement of the confl ict be given.9 In 
8 See the classic outline by John Lewis Gaddis in J. Gaddis, ‘The Emerging 
Post-Revisionist Thesis on the Origins of the Cold War’, Diplomatic History 7 
(1983), 171–190.
9 John Lewis Gaddis, We Now Know. Rethinking Cold War History. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press 1997.
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spite the criticism levelled against this approach to what ‘the New Cold 
War history’ is and should be concerned with, this may in the end not 
have been the most problematic challenge historians faced in the post-
Cold War world.
As the opening contributions of the book show, history, and by 
implication historians, became closely involved in a public process of 
reassessing the ‘burdens of the past’, and the ways in which the public 
would become aware and eventually get rid of them. These attempts 
at ‘managing the past’ have been closely entwined with contemporary 
power struggles, as shown by  Pilvi Torsti in her chapter on the Bronze 
Soldier dispute in Estonia. In the post-communist countries physical and 
symbolic relics of the ancient regime became a fi eld of heated debate 
and political contest. However, and somewhat surprisingly, the calls for 
truth commissions, offi cial inquiries and commissioned histories of Cold 
War events and experiences, found resonance in the victorious West 
as well as in the East, where Cold War history could also be brushed 
aside altogether, as has happened in present day Russia. In this situation 
professional historians faced a diffi cult task to combine their public 
duties as important actors in Vergangenheitsbewältigung, i.e. collective 
dealing with the past, but also as individual scholars tasked to understand, 
sometimes explain, and not to judge.
Maybe Cold War history always was and still is too important a 
subject to be left for historians alone. But historians cannot leave it alone, 
for reasons we hope will become clear in the chapters that follow.
I 
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Why do History Politics Matter?
The Case of the Estonian
Bronze Soldier 
 PILVI TORSTI
In my earlier work I have developed the various concepts and phenom e na 
related to the presence of history.1 In this article I attempt to analyse the 
Estonian Bronze Soldier dispute in spring 2007 as an example of history 
politics and other phenomena related to the presence of history. Finally I 
shall close with a discussion of the signifi cance of history politics through 
analysing the consequences of history politics in Estonia and elsewhere.
THE SEQUENCE OF EVENTS IN THE ESTONIAN BRONZE SOLDIER CASE
In 1947, a statue of a bronze soldier was erected in the capital of Estonia, 
three years after the arrival of Soviet troops and defeat of the Nazis. It 
was a Soviet war memorial, ‘a Monument to the Liberators of Tallinn’. 
It was located in a park in central Tallinn above a burial site of Soviet 
soldiers’ remains, which had been reburied on the site in 1945. In 1964 
an eternal fl ame was placed in front of the monument.
1 See P. Torsti, Divergent Stories, Convergent Attitudes. Study on the Presence 
of History, History Textbooks, and the Thinking of Youth in post-War Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. Helsinki: Taifuuni 2003, 45–53.
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When Estonia re-established its independence in 1991, the theme of 
liberation, which formed the core of the Soviet approach to history in 
the Baltic states, was rejected. In this connection, the bronze statue was 
re-named ‘For Those Fallen in the Second World War’. The eternal fl ame 
was put out at the same time and the name of the square was changed 
from ‘Liberators’ Square’ to Tönismägi.2
Preparations for relocating the memorial started after clashes at the 
monument in 2006. In February 2007, the Law on Forbidden Structures 
(which would have banned the public display of monuments glorifying the 
So viet Union or Estonia’s fi fty years of Bolshevism, and aimed specifi cally 
at the Bronze Soldier) was vetoed by the Estonian President,  Toomas 
Hendrik Ilves, who argued that the bill did not comply with the Estonian 
constitution.3 Estonian Russians and Russia voiced their disagreement 
with the bill when it was being discussed in the Parliament.4
According to the latest census (2000) ethnic Russians form 26 per 
cent of the Estonian population. Based on a 2006 estimation, about one 
third of Estonia’s Russian speakers are Estonian citizens, another third 
have Russian citizenship, and around nine per cent are of undefi ned 
citizenship. The Estonian population, which made up 82 per cent of the 
country in 1934, had decreased to 62 per cent by 1991 as a result of mass 
deportations of ethnic Estonians during the Soviet era, together with 
migration into Estonia from other parts of the Soviet Union.5 In the 2000 
census the fi gure was 68 per cent.6 
The job of relocating the statue and the remains of the buried soldiers 
in the Defence Forces Cemetery of Tallinn fi nally started in April 2007, 
2 Helsingin Sanomat (HS), Aljosan lähtöä Tallinnasta edelsi vuoden kestänyt 
riita. 28 Apr. 2007. 
3 International Herald Tribune (IHT), Estonian president vetoes law calling for 
removal of Soviet monument. 22 Feb. 2007. <http://www.iht.com>. 28 Aug. 
2007.
4 HS, 28 Apr. 2007.
5 After the Russian population the biggest ex-Soviet single groups in 2000 were 
Ukrainians (2%) and Belorussians (1%). 
6 UN Demographic Yearbook 2002. Population by national and/or ethnic group, 
sex and urban/Rural residence: each census, 1985–2002. < http://unstats.un.org>. 
27 Nov 2007; U.S. Department of State, Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs. 
Background Note: Estonia. <http://www.state.gov>. 27 Aug. 2007.
